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1 Introduction
Are sovereign debt crises caused by bad fundamentals alone, or do expectations play
an independent role? The main point of the paper is that both fundamentals and
expectations can play important roles. High interest rates can be triggered by self-
conrming expectations. In particular, high interest rates can induce high default
probabilities that in turn justify the high rates. It is also the case, however, that the
self fullling high rate equilibria arise only when debt levels are relatively high. The
model analyzed can help to explain the large and abrupt increases in spreads during
sovereign debt crises, particularly in countries that have accumulated large debt levels,
as seen in the recent European experience. It can also justify the policy response by
the European Central Bank, to be credited for the equally large and abrupt reduction
in sovereign spreads.1
The literature on sovereign debt crises is ambiguous on the role of expectations. In a
model with rollover risk, Cole and Kehoe (2000) have established that sunspots can play
a role that is strengthened by bad fundamentals. Using a di¤erent mechanism, Calvo
(1988) also shows that there are multiple -low and high- interest rate equilibria. The
reason is that, although interest rates may be high because of high default probabilities,
it is also the case that high interest rates induce high default probabilities. This
gives rise to equilibria with high rates/likely default and low rates/unlikely default.
In contrast with the results in those models, in the standard quantitative model of
sovereign default, as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) or Arellano (2008), there is a
single low interest rate equilibrium.
1At the ECB press conference of September 6 of 2012, where the Outright Monetary Transac-
tions program was announced, President Draghi explicitly stated his beliefs of a self-fulling nature
behind the increase in spreads as justication for the program. In his words: "[...] the assess-
ment of the Governing Council is that we are in a situation now where you have large parts of the
euro area in what we call a bad equilibrium, namely an equilibrium where you may have self-
fullling expectations that feed upon themselves and generate very adverse scenarios. So, there is
a case for intervening, in a sense, to break these expectations[...]". See the announcement here:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html
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In this paper, we take the model of Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano
(2008), which builds on the model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), and make minor
changes in the modeling choices concerning the timing of moves by debtors and creditors
and the actions that they may take. In so doing, we are able to produce both high
and low rate equilibria. The reason for the multiplicity is the one identied by Calvo
(1988) and more recently analyzed in Lorenzoni and Werning (2013).
The change in the modeling choices is minor because it is not clear how direct
evidence can be used to discriminate across them. The timing and action assumptions
concern the sequence of moves by creditors and borrower and whether the borrower
chooses current debt or debt at maturity. The actual institutional details behind bond
auctions do not provide direct evidence on those assumptions.
Our theoretical exploration of self-fullling equilibria in interest rate spreads is
motivated by two particular episodes of sovereign debt crises. The rst is the Argentine
crisis of 1998-2002. Back in 1993, Argentina had regained access to international capital
markets. Argentinas debt to GDP ratio was roughly between 35% and 45% during the
period very low by international standards. The average yearly growth rate of GDP
was around 5%. But the average country risk spread on dollar denominated bonds for
the period 1993-1999, relative to the US bond, was 7%. Notice that a 7% spread on a
35% debt to GDP ratio amounts to almost 2.5% of GDP on extra interest payments
per year.2 Accumulated over the 1993-1999 period, this is 15% of GDP, almost half
the debt to GDP ratio of Argentina in 1993. An obvious question arises: if Argentina
had faced lower interest rates, would it have defaulted in 2002?
The second episode is the recent European sovereign debt crisis that started in
2010 and has receded substantially since the policy announcements by the European
Central Bank (ECB) in September 2012. The spreads on Italian and Spanish public
debt, very close to zero since the introduction of the euro and until April 2009, were
higher than 5% by the summer of 2012, when the ECB announced the program of
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). The spreads were considerably higher in
Portugal, and especially in Ireland and Greece. With the announcement of the OMTs,
according to which the central bank stands ready to purchase euro area sovereign debt
in secondary markets, the spreads in most of those countries slid down to less than 2%,
even though the ECB did not actually intervene. The potential self-fullling nature of
2This calculation unrealistically assumes one-period maturity bonds only. Its purpose is only to
illustrate the point in a simple way.
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the events leading to the high spreads of the summer 2012 was explicitly used by the
president of the ECB to justify the policy.3
The model is a small open economy with a random endowment. A representative
agent can borrow noncontingent bonds and cannot commit to repayment. Defaulting
carries a penalty. The borrower faces atomistic risk-neutral foreign creditors, so that
their expected return, taking default probabilities into account, has to be equal to the
risk-free interest rate. The timing and action assumptions are the following. In the
beginning of the period, given the level of debt gross of interest and the realization
of the endowment, the borrower decides whether to default. If there is default, the
endowment is low. Otherwise, creditors move rst and o¤er their limited funds at
some interest rate. The borrower moves next and borrows from the low-rate creditors
up to some total optimal debt level. In equilibrium, the creditors all charge the same
rate, which is the one associated with the probability of default for the optimal level
of debt chosen by the country. With these timing assumptions, there are multiple
interest rate equilibria. High interest rates can generate high default rates, which in
turn justify high interest rates. In equilibria such as these, there is a sense in which
interest rates are "too high."
With this timing, when deciding how much to borrow, the borrower takes the
interest rate as given. This does not mean that the borrower behaves like a small
agent. In the fully dynamic model, with more than two periods, even if the borrower
would take current prices as given, the e¤ects of current choices on future prices would
still be taken into account. The borrower in this model is just not beneting from a
rst mover advantage. A similar timing assumption in Bassetto (2005) also generates
multiple La¤er curve equilibria. In Bassetto, if the government were to move rst and
pick the tax, there would be a single low tax equilibrium. Instead, if households move
rst choosing how much labor to supply, there is also a high tax equilibrium. Bassetto
argues that the assumption that the government is a large agent is unrelated to the
timing of the moves.
With this timing in which creditors move rst, and also when moves are simultane-
ous, there are multiple equilibria, regardless of whether the borrower chooses current
debt or debt at maturity. In contrast, under the standard timing in which the borrower
moves rst, this is a key distinction .
3The decision has raised controversy. In 2014, the German Constitutional Court ruled the OMT
to be incompatible with the constitution.
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The standard timing assumption in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano
(2008), or Calvo (1988) and Lorenzoni and Werning (2013), is that the borrower moves
rst, before the creditors. They also assume that the borrower chooses the debt level
at maturity, including interest payments. Creditors move next and respond with a
schedule that species a single interest rate for each level of debt gross of interest. By
moving rst and choosing the debt at maturity, gross of interest, the borrower is able
to select a point in the schedule. The borrower will optimally pin down the low interest
rate/low probability of default. It follows that there is a single equilibrium. The rst
mover advantage allows the borrower to coordinate the creditors actions on the low
interest rate equilibrium.
There is no rst mover advantage if instead, the borrower, in spite of moving rst,
chooses current debt, rather than debt at maturity. In this case, interest rate schedule
will be a function of current debt, and there will be multiple schedules.4 The reason
is that, given current debt, if the interest rate is high, so is debt at maturity, and
therefore the probability of default is also high. This is the spirit of the analysis in
Calvo (1988), as well as Lorenzoni and Werning (2013).
Lorenzoni and Werning (2013) analyze a dynamic version of Calvos model with
exogenous public decits, and argue against the possibility of the government choosing
debt at maturity. For that, they build a one period game with an innite number of
subperiods and assume that the government cannot commit not to reissue debt in those
subperiods. As a result, the government is unable to select a point on the interest rate
schedule, behaving as a price taker.5 The result in the game of Lorenzoni and Werning
could thus be interpreted as a ipping of the timing of moves of borrower and creditors.
The possibility to always reissue would be as if the borrower was moving second, after
the creditors, as in our timing.
As mentioned above, the reason for expectation-driven high interest rate equilibria
in these models is di¤erent from the one in Cole and Kehoe (2000). Still, in both
setups it is the timing of moves that is crucial to generate multiplicity. In Cole and
Kehoe, there is multiplicity when the choice of how much debt to issue takes place
before the decision to default. In that case, it may be individually optimal for the
4In Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), even if that is the assumption on the actions of the country, they
dismiss the multiplicity by assumption (discussed further in Section 2.3).
5The result is analogous to the one in the durable good monopoly literature, that without intertem-
poral costs, a monopoly, competing with its own future self, behaves as a price taker.
5
creditors not to roll over the debt, which amounts to charging arbitrarily high interest
rates. This may induce default, conrming the high interest rates. In our model, there
is no rollover risk because the decision of default is at the beginning of the period. Still,
a timing assumption similar to the one in Cole and Kehoe generates the multiplicity.
As creditors move rst, it can be individually optimal to ask for high rates. That will
induce a high probability of default, conrming the high rates.
For standard distributions of the endowment, the high rate equilibria have prop-
erties that make them vulnerable to reasonable renements, which we provide in an
appendix. Those high rates can be in parts of the supply curve in which the rates
decrease with the level of debt. If that is the case, then the total gross service of the
debt also decreases with an increase in the level of debt. For those high rates, creditors
also jointly benet from lowering interest rates because of their e¤ect on probabilities
of default. These are all features of the high rate equilibria in Calvo (1988). But as we
show, multiplicity does not disappear even if those equilibria are rened away. To show
this, we consider bimodal distributions for the endowment, with good and bad times.
With those distributions, there are low and high rate equilibria, equally robust, for the
same level of debt. The set of equilibria has the feature that for low levels of debt, there
is only one equilibrium. Interest rates are low and increase slowly with the level of debt.
As debt becomes relatively high, then there are both low and high rate equilibria. For
even higher levels of debt, there is a single high rate equilibrium, until eventually there
is none.6 As we explain in detail in the paper, we consider these bimodal distributions
as reecting the likelihood of relatively long periods of stagnation, as currently dis-
cussed in Europe, in a way that resembles the Markov-switching processes for output
popularized by Hamilton (1989).7 We emphasize the role of large debt levels and the
plausibility of long periods of stagnation as drivers of the multiplicity.
In the region where the interest rates are unnecessarily high, policy can be e¤ective
in selecting a low rate equilibrium. A large lender can accomplish the missing coordi-
nation by lending up to a maximum amount at a penalty rate. In equilibrium, only
private creditors would be lending. This may help us understand the role of policies
such as the OMTs introduced by the ECB, following the announcement by its president
that it would do "whatever it takes" to avoid a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area.
6Lorenzoni and Werning (2013) also consider such distributions. They do not give them empirical
content, as we do.
7See also the evidence in Jones and Olken (2008) for an international perspective.
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The analysis highlights a key role for quantity restrictions in the design of policies
aimed at eliminating the "bad" equilibria, suggesting that to do "whatever it takes,"
understood as no limit on bond purchases, does not follow from the model.
The theoretical analysis in the paper is done in simple a two-period model to high-
light the importance of both timing and action assumptions for multiple interest rate
equilibria to arise, clarifying apparent inconsistencies in the literature. By exposing
the importance of these assumptions, we argue for the empirical relevance of that mul-
tiplicity. We also perform a simple quantitative exercise in a calibrated dynamic model
in which a sunspot variable is introduced, triggering coordination on high or low in-
terest rates. To calibrate the bimodal distribution for the endowment process with
periods of stagnation, we estimate a Markov-switching regime for the growth rate of
output for Portugal, Spain, and Italy, as well as for Argentina and the United States,
using data from 1960 to 2014. The model is shown to be consistent with a sovereign
debt crisis unraveling, in particular when debt is relatively large and the probability of
a relatively long period of stagnation is high. The fact that debt choices are optimal8
and the model is fully dynamic allows for the discussion of the role of the endogenous
decision to borrow on the likelihood and characteristics of the debt crisis.
Finally, we should mention that there is a large literature extending Calvo (1988)
and Cole and Kehoe (2000) in directions other than the ones we are concerned in this
paper. See for example Aguiar, Amador, Farhi and Gopinath (2014), Bocola and Dovis
(2015), Conessa and Kehoe (2012), Corsetti and Dedola (2013) and Roch and Uhlig
(2015) among others.
Closer to our work is Lorenzoni and Werning (2013). They make the case for
expectations driven multiple equilibria in the same class of models. While they do it
in the context of the Calvo (1988) model, with the standard timing, arguing against
the choice of debt at maturity, we instead show that the timing of moves is crucial
independently of the actions of the borrower. Lorenzoni and Werning are as dismissive
as we are of the high rate equilibria in Calvo downward sloping schedules. And they
also point out that alternative distributions can produce multiplicity along positively
sloped schedules. We pursue the possibility that the bimodal distribution can actually
be consistent with the data, based on the observation of long periods of stagnation
that appear to be revelant for the onset of debt crises. Instead, Lorenzoni and Werning
choose to focus on a di¤erent source of multiplicity. They consider long maturity debt
8In Lorenzoni and Werning (2013) debt is exogenous.
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and focus the analysis on equilibria with debt dilution. Finally, another di¤erence in
the two approaches is that Lorenzoni and Werning study a model in which scal policy
is exogenous. We instead characterize equilibria with optimal debt choices. In our
model, the possibility of a long stagnation is key, so we view our results as illustrative
of possibilities over the medium to long run, and it seems natural to consider scal
policy as endogenous in that case. Our choice has the advantage that we can discuss
the role of the endogenous decision to borrow on the likelihood and characteristics of
a debt crisis. This disciplinary role of crises is discussed in detail in the quantitative
section.
2 A two-period model
We rst consider a simple two-period model where analytical results can be derived
and some of the features of the model can be seen clearly. In particular, it is easier
to understand what drives the multiplicity of spreads and default probabilities that
resembles the result in Calvo (1988).
We analyze a two-period endowment economy populated by a representative agent
that draws utility from consumption in each period, and by a continuum of risk-neutral
foreign creditors. Each creditor has limited capacity, but there are enough of them so
that there is no constraint on the aggregate credit capacity. The period utility function
of the representative agent, U , is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave
and to satisfy standard Inada conditions. The endowment is assumed to be equal to
1 in the rst period. That is the lower bound of the support of the distribution of
the endowment in the second period. Indeed, uncertainty regarding future outcomes is
described by a stochastic endowment y 2 [1; Y ], with density f(y) and corresponding
cdf F (y): The outstanding initial level of debt is assumed to be zero, and in period
one, the representative agent can borrow b in a noncontingent bond in international
nancial markets. The risk-neutral gross international interest rate is R. In period
two, after observing the realization of the shock, the borrower decides to either pay
the debt gross of interest, Rb, or default. If there is default, consumption is equal to
the lower bound of the endowment process, 1. Note that there may be contingencies
under which the borrower chooses to default, and the interest rate charged by foreign
creditors, R, may di¤er from the risk-free rate R.
The timing of moves is as follows. In the rst period, each creditor i 2 [0; 1] o¤ers
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the limited funds at the gross interest rate Ri. The borrower moves next and picks the
level of debt b =
R 1
0
bidi, where bi is how much is borrowed from each creditor. The
borrowers best response is to borrow from the low interest rate lenders rst. In order
for lenders to make zero prots in equilibrium, the interest rates they charge will have
to be the same, Ri = R. We focus on symmetric outcomes where if Ri = Rj; then
bi = bj. Then, bi = b for all i 2 [0; 1]; so
R 1
0
biRidi = a = Rb:
In the second period, the borrower decides whether to default or pay the debt in
full. The borrower decides to default if and only if U

y   R 1
0
biRidi

 U (1), or
y  1 +
Z 1
0
biRidi.
Accordingly, default happens whenever
y  1 + bR,
which denes a default threshold for output. The probability of default is then F [1 + bR].
Since creditors are risk neutral, the expected return of lending to the borrower in
this economy must be the same as R, so
R = R [1  F (1 + bR)] : (1)
This denes a locus of points (b; R) such that each point solves the problem of the
creditors, which can be interpreted as a supply curve of funds. The mapping from
debt levels to interest rates is a correspondence because, in general, for each b there
are multiple Rs that satisfy equation (1). Multiple functions can be selected with the
points of the correspondence. We call those functions interest rate schedules.
The optimal choice of debt by the borrower is the one that maximizes utility:
U(1 + b) + 

F (1 + bR)U(1) +
Z Y
1+bR
U(y   bR)f(y)dy

; (2)
subject also to an upper bound restriction on the maximum level of debt. Absent
this condition, the optimal choice would be to borrow an arbitrarily large amount and
default with probability one. The supply of debt would be zero in equilibrium.
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The marginal condition, for an interior solution, is
U 0(1 + b) = R
Z Y
1+bR
U 0(y   bR)f (y) dy: (3)
The optimal choice of debt for a given interest rate denes a locus of points (b; R) that
can be interpreted as a demand curve for funds. The possible equilibria will be the
points where the demand curve intersects the supply curve above described by (1).
An equilibrium in this economy can then be dened as follows:
Denition 1 An equilibrium is an interest rate eR and a debt level eb such that (i) giveneR, eb maximizes (2); and (ii) the arbitrage condition (1) is satised.
2.1 Multiple equilibria
As mentioned above, there are in general multiple equilibria in this model low rate
equilibria and high rate equilibria that resemble the multiple equilibria in Calvo
(1988).
We now analyze the supply curve dened implicitly by (1). For that purpose, it is
useful to dene the function for the expected return on the debt:
h (R; b) = R [1  F (1 + bR)] ,
which in equilibrium must be equal to the riskless rate, R. Notice that for R = 0, we
have h (0; b) = 0. If the distribution of the endowment has a bounded support, for R
high enough, if 1 + bR  Y , then h (R; b) = 0. For many distributions, the function
h (R; b) is concave, so that there are at most two solutions for R = h (R; b).
In Figure 1, the curve h (R; b) is depicted against R, where F is the cumulative
normal.9 An increase in b shifts the curve h downward so that the solutions for b are
closer to each other. The function h (R; b) does not need to be concave everywhere;
this will depend on the cumulative distribution F (1 + bR). 10
Figure 2 plots the solutions for R of equation (1) for each level of debt and also for
the normal distribution.
9The black vertical dotted lines are grid lines. We kept them in the plots throughout the paper to
make the exposition clearer.
10The function h (R; b) is concave in R whenever 2f (1 + bR)   f 0 (1 + bR) bR.
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Figure 1: Expected return h(R; b)
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Figure 2: Interest rate schedules
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Figure 3: Supply and demand curves
The supply curve of Figure 2 has two monotonic schedules. For lower values of the
interest rate, there is a at schedule that is increasing in b (solid line). There is also a
steeper decreasing schedule for higher values of the interest rate (dashed line).
The equilibrium must also be on a demand curve for the borrower, obtained from
the solution of the problem dened in (2). Figure 3 depicts the two curves: the supply
curve (red) and the demand curve (blue). As can be seen, there are two possible
equilibria.
The points on the decreasing schedule have particularly striking properties. For
those points on the supply curve, not only does the interest rate go down with the
level of debt, b, but also the gross service of the debt, Rb, decreases with the level of
debt, b. To see this, notice that from (1), R increases with the level of Rb. The points
on the decreasing schedule are weak candidates for equilibria in the following sense.
Consider a perturbation of a point ( bR;bb) in that schedule that consists of the same
value for the interest rate but a slightly lower value for debt ( bR;bb   "). This point
would lie below the schedule. At the point ( bR;bb   "); the interest rate is the same as
in ( bR;bb); but the debt is lower, so the probability of default is also lower. Thus, prots
for the creditors are higher than at ( bR;bb); where prots are zero. This means that a
small reduction in the interest rate is benecial for both the borrower and the lender,
which suggests that these equilibria may not survive reasonable renements.
12
In Appendix 1 we perturb the extensive form game by adding an additional stage
to the rst period. In that second stage of the rst period, the borrower can make
an o¤er to a coalition of creditors of a lower, but close, interest rate. Under certain
detailed assumptions on the structure of the game, the equilibria on the decreasing
schedule can be ruled out.11 We think of this perturbation as a way of rening the set
of equilibria. It is a concept of renement by completing the model introducing further
details. As with every renement, there are fragilities with the one we provide. We
do not claim that the renement is the most natural. Rather, we argue that, even if
the multiplicity in Calvo (1988) can be rened away, there is still multiplicity that is
robust. This is the content of the next section.
2.1.1 A distribution with good and bad times
Equation (1) may have more than two solutions for R, for a given b, depending on
the distribution of the endowment process. One case in which there can be multiple
increasing schedules is when the distribution combines two normal distributions a
distribution for good times and a distribution for bad times.
Consider two independent random variables, y1 and y2, both normal with di¤erent
means, 1 and 2, respectively, and the same standard deviation, . Now, let the
endowment in the second period, y; be equal to y1 with probability p and equal to y2
with probability 1  p.
If the two means, 1 and 2, are su¢ ciently apart, then (1) has four solutions for
some values of the debt, as Figure 4 shows. The correspondence between levels of
debt and R, as solutions to the arbitrage equation above, is plotted in Figure 4, in
which p = 0:8, 1 = 4, 2 = 6, and  = 0:1. The relatively high probability and the
average severity of a disaster can be thought of as a relatively frequent, long period
of stagnation. This is in line with the estimation of Hamilton (1989) of high and low
growth regime switching processes. For the fully quantitative exercise, see Ayres et al
(2015).
Clearly, there are low enough debt levels for which there are only two solutions, so
there is only one increasing schedule. But for intermediate levels of debt, the equation
11There are two important assumptions, as we explain in detail in Appendix 1. First, there must
exist a minimal degree of coordination, which, for some equilibria in the decreasing schedule, may be
large. Second, the rst-period auction must be anonymous, in the sense that ex-ante di¤erences that
arise because of the perturbation cannot be observed by the borrower.
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Figure 4: Expected return for the bimodal distribution h (R; b)
has four solutions and therefore multiple increasing schedules. This means that, even
if one is restricted not to consider equilibria on decreasing schedules, the model may
still exhibit multiplicity. Notice that the multiplicity on the increasing schedules arises
for relatively high levels of debt.
The supply curve for this case of a bimodal distribution is indicated by the solid
red line in Figure 5. The demand is shown by the dotted blue line in the same gure.
Notice that multiplicity only arises if the demand curve is high enough, so the resulting
equilibrium level of debt is high. The demand is discontinuous in this case, since
the maximum problem in (2) has two interior local maxima, because of the bimodal
distribution. As the interest rate changes, the relative value of utility between the two
local maxima changes.
If the debt level is relatively large, multiple equilibria are more likely to arise. This
is the case with the bimodal distribution analyzed earlier. It is also the case that,
when the value of the debt is close to the maximum and a single mode distribution is
perturbed by adding a nonmonotonic function, multiplicity arises. The details are in
Appendix 2.
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Figure 5: Supply and demand for the bimodal distribution
2.2 Policy
To illustrate the e¤ects of policy, the case of the bimodal distribution depicted in Figure
5 is considered. The extensions to other cases are straightforward.
Consider that there is a new agent, a foreign creditor that can act as a large lender,
with deep pockets.12 This large lender can o¤er to lend to the country, at a policy
rate RP any amount lower than or equal to a maximum level bP . Let bP and RP
be the debt level and interest rate corresponding to the maximum point of the low
(solid line) increasing schedule in Figure 5. In this case, the only equilibrium is the
point corresponding to the intersection of demand and supply on the low interest rate
increasing schedule. In addition, the amount borrowed from the large lender is zero.
The equilibrium interest rate is lower than the one o¤ered by the large lender because
at that interest rate RP and for debt levels strictly below bP , there would be prots.
Notice that the large lender cannot o¤er to lend any quantity at the penalty rate.
Whatever the rate is, the level of lending o¤ered has to be limited by the points on
the supply curve. Otherwise, the borrower may borrow a very high amount and then
default.
12If the borrower was a small agent rather than a sovereign, any creditor could possibly play this
role.
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2.3 Current debt versus debt at maturity
The borrower in the model analyzed earlier chooses current debt. Would it make a
di¤erence if the borrower were to choose debt at maturity, gross of interest? We now
consider an alternative game in which the timing of the moves is as before, but now
the borrower chooses the value of debt at maturity, which we denote by a, rather than
the amount borrowed, b. Are there still multiple equilibria in this setup? The answer
is yes. With this timing of moves, there are multiple interest rate equilibria whether
the government chooses the amount borrowed, b, or the amount paid back, a. This
is a relevant question, because in the models of Calvo (1988) and Arellano (2008),
the assumption of whether the borrower chooses b or a is key to having uniqueness or
multiplicity of equilibria, as will be discussed later.13
Here again, the creditors move rst and o¤er the limited funds at gross interest
rate Ri, i 2 [0; 1]. The borrower moves next and picks the level of debt at maturity
a =
R 1
0
aidi. As before, the rate charged by each creditor will have to be the same
in equilibrium. In the second period, the borrower defaults if and only if y  1 + a.
Arbitrage in international capital markets implies that
R = R [1  F (1 + a)] : (4)
The locus of points (a;R) dened by (4), which we interpret as a supply curve of
funds, is monotonically increasing (which is not the case for the supply curve in b and
R dened in (1)).
The utility of the borrower is
U(1 +
a
R
) + 

F (1 + a)U(1) +
Z Y
1+a
U(y   a)f(y)dy

; (5)
where 1
R
is the price of one unit of a as of the rst period. The marginal condition is
U 0(1 +
a
R
) = R
Z Y
1+a
U 0(y   a)f (y) dy: (6)
The locus of points (a;R) dened by the solution to this maximization problem can
be interpreted as a demand curve for funds. Again, this demand curve with the supply
13The key for the di¤erent results is the timing assumption, as claried in Section 3.
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Figure 6: Choosing value of debt at maturity a or amount borrowed b
curve has multiple intersection points. Provided the choice of a is interior, those points
are the solutions to the system of two equations, (4) and (6), but those are the same
two equations (1) and (3) that determine the same equilibrium outcomes for R and b
for a = Rb.
Figure 6 plots the supply curves for (b; R) and (a;R) dened in (1) and (4), respec-
tively, for the normal distribution. It also plots the demand curves dened in (6) and
(3) for the logarithmic utility function. With the timing assumed so far, whether the
borrower chooses debt net or gross of interest is irrelevant.
3 Timing of moves and multiplicity: Related liter-
ature
The timing of moves assumed above, with the creditors moving rst, amounts to as-
suming that the borrower in this two-period game takes the current price of debt as
given. The more common assumption in the literature is that the borrower moves
rst, choosing debt levels b or a, and facing a schedule of interest rates as a function
of those levels of debt, R = R (b) or R = 1
q(a)
, depending on whether the choice is b or
a, respectively.
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Suppose the schedule the borrower faces is q (a), corresponding to the supply curve
derived from (4) and depicted in the right-hand panel of Figure 6. This is a monoton-
ically increasing function. Since the borrower can choose a, the borrower is always
going to choose in the low R/low a part of the schedule. The borrower also takes into
account the monopoly power in choosing the level of a. These are the assumptions in
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). The equilibrium is unique.
Suppose now that the borrower faces the full supply curve as depicted in Figure
2 with an increasing low rate schedule and a decreasing high rate schedule. Then
by picking b, the borrower is not able to select the equilibrium outcome.14 There are
multiple possible interest rates that make creditors equally happy. The way this can be
formalized, as in Calvo (1988),15 is with multiple interest rate functions R (b), selected
from the correspondence dened in (1), which can be the low rate increasing schedule
or the high rate decreasing one. Any other combination of those two schedules is also
possible. The borrower is o¤ered one schedule of the interest rate as a function of the
debt level b and chooses debt optimally given the schedule.
In summary, the assumption on the timing of moves is a key assumption to have
multiple equilibria or a single equilibrium. If the creditors move rst, there are multiple
equilibrium interest rates and debt levels, and they are the same equilibria whether
the borrower chooses current debt or debt at maturity. Instead, if the borrower moves
rst and chooses debt at maturity, as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano
(2008), there is a single equilibrium. Choosing debt at maturity amounts to picking
the probability of default and therefore the interest rate as well. Finally, if the borrower
moves rst and chooses the current level of debt, given an interest rate schedule dened
as a one-to-one mapping from b to R, then the equilibrium will depend on the schedule
and there is a continuum of equilibrium schedules. This is the approach in Calvo
(1988).
Lorenzoni and Werning (2013) Lorenzoni and Werning (2013) use a dynamic,
simplied version of the Calvo (1988) model, in which the borrower is a government
with exogenous decits or surpluses. In a two-period version, there is an exogenous
14Trivially, it is still possible to obtain uniqueness in the case in which the borrower faces the
supply curve in R and b dened by (1). If the borrower picks R, then it is able to select the low rate
equilibrium directly. That is essentially what happens when the borrower faces the schedule R (a)
and picks a.
15In Calvo (1988), debt is exogenous.
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decit in the rst period  sh, with sh > 0. In the second period, the surplus is
stochastic, s 2  sh; S, with density f(s) and corresponding cdf F (s). In order to
nance the decit in the rst period, the government needs to borrow b = sh. In the
second period, it is possible to pay back the debt if s  bR, where R is the gross
interest rate charged by foreign lenders.
The creditors are competitive, they must make zero prots. It follows that R =
R (1  F (bR)). If we had written q = 1
R
and a = bR, the condition would be R =
1
q
(1  F (a)). As before, it is possible to use these equations to obtain functions R (b)
using the rst equation and q (a) using the second equation. These would be the two
classes of schedules that were identied in the analysis earlier, when the government
moves rst. For the normal distribution, the schedules R (b) and q (a) will look like the
supply curves in Figure 6. There are multiple equilibrium schedules R (b). There is the
good, increasing schedule and the bad, decreasing schedule, and there is a continuum
of other schedules with points from any of those two schedules. The government that
borrows b = sh may have to pay high or low a = R (b) b depending on which schedule
is being used with the corresponding probabilities of default.
What if the schedule, instead, is q (a)? The schedule is unique, but there are
multiple points in the schedule that nance b. The government that borrows q (a) a =
sh can do so with low a and low 1
q
or with high a and high 1
q
. If the government is able
to pick a, then implicitly it is picking the interest rate. Lorenzoni and Werning (2013)
use an interesting argument for the inability of the government to pick the debt level
a. For that they devise a game in which they divide the period into an innite number
of subperiods and do not allow for commitment in reissuing debt within the period.
In that model, the government takes the price as given. The intuition is similar to the
durable good monopoly result. In our model, the large agent also takes the price as
given because of the timing assumption.
Eaton-Gersovitz (1981) In the model in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), the bor-
rower moves rst, so it is key whether the equilibrium schedule is in b or a. In
our notation, they consider a schedule in b, R (b). To be more precise, they dene
R (b) = R (b) b. Their equation (8) can be written as
[1   (R (b))]R (b) = (1 + r)b
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, where  is the probability of default that depends on the level of debt at maturity
and r is the risk free net interest rate. In our notation this can be written as
[1   (R (b) b)]R (b) = R;
where  (R (b) b)  F (1 + bR (b)) ; which is equation (1) in our model. As seen earlier,
there are multiple schedules in this case. Eaton and Gersovitz do not consider the
decreasing schedule by assuming that R (b) b cannot go down when b goes up. This
amounts to excluding decreasing schedules by assumption.16
4 The innite period model: Numerical exploration
In order to keep the analysis closer to the literature that has computed equilibria with
sovereign debt crises in models without a role for sunspots, as in Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) and Arellano (2008), we consider their timing in which the borrower moves
rst. In order for there to be a role for sunspots, the borrower chooses the current debt
rather than debt at maturity.
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; : : :. The endowment y follows a Markov
process with conditional distribution F (y0jy). At the beginning of every period, after
observing the endowment realization y, the borrower can decide whether to repay the
debt or to default. Upon default, the borrower is permanently excluded from nancial
markets and the value of the endowment becomes yd 2 R+ forever.17
The period utility function, U(c), is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly
concave and to satisfy standard Inada conditions. Thus,
V aut =
U(yd)
1   (7)
is the value of default.
We allow for a sunspot variable s that takes values in S = f1; 2; :::; Ng and follows
a Markov distribution p(s0js). Upon not having defaulted in the past, every period the
borrower chooses the current debt b0 given an interest rate schedule that may depend
16See proof of Theorem 3 in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
17Note that the value of autarky is independent of the state previous to default. This substantially
simplies the analysis.
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on the realization of the sunspot variable s.
The case with two schedules We analyze the case with two possible schedules
for the bimodal distribution studied earlier. The sunspot variable can take two possible
realizations, s = 1; 2, which indexes the interest rate schedule R(b0; y; s) faced by the
borrower. The value for the borrower that did not default is given by V (!; y; s),
satisfying
V (!; y; s) = max
c;b0;!0

U(c) + Ey0;s0

max

V aut; V (!0; y0; s; )
	 jy; s	 (8)
subject to
c  ! + b0
!0 = y0   b0R(b0; y; s)
b0  b
Wealth ! is used as a state variable (instead of current debt) because it reduces
the dimensionality of the state space.18 The borrowing limit is important. Since the
borrower receives a unit of consumption for every unit of debt issued, it could always
postpone default by issuing more debt. This is ruled out by imposing a maximum
amount of debt.
The interest rate schedule R(b0; y; s) is a function of the amount of debt because
default probabilities depend on it, and the interest rate reects the likelihood of default.
It is also a function of current output; since the endowment follows a Markov process, it
contains information about future default probabilities. Naturally, there are innitely
many possible pairs of schedules. We focus only on the pair in which, given one possible
value of the sunspot, the schedules either always pick the low interest rate or always
the high interest rate.
Default follows a threshold y(b0; y; s; s0) such that the optimal rule is to pay the
debt as long as y0  y(b0; y; s; s0) and default otherwise.19 The threshold for default is
18If we were to keep current debt b as a state, we would also need to know the previous period
interest rate that is a function of the debt level in the previous period.
19All equilibria have this property as long as @V (!;y;s)@y  0, which is the case with non-negative
serial correlation of the endowment process.
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the level of y0 = y(b0; y; s; s0) that solves
V aut = V (!0; y0; s0) = V (y0   b0R(b0; y; s); y0; s0) : (9)
Creditors o¤er their amount of funds as long as the expected return is R. The
arbitrage condition for the risk-free creditors that pins down the schedule R(b0; y; s) is
R = R(b0; y; s)
X
s0=1;2
p(s0js) 1  F  y(b0; y; s; s0)jy ; (10)
where y(b0; y; s; s0) is dened by (9).
Equilibrium An equilibrium is given by functions
V (!; y; s); c(!; y; s); b0 (!; y; s) ; R(b0; y; s); y(b0; y; s; s0)
such that
1. given R (b0; y; s), policies c(!; y; s) and b0 (!; y; s) solve (8) and achieve V (!; y; s).
2. given V (!; y; s), the default threshold y(b0; y; s; s0) solves (9).
3. the schedule R (b0; y; s) satises condition (10).
4.1 Simulations
In this section, we compute equilibria to show that the model can replicate salient
features of the recent European sovereign debt crisis. In particular, we discuss to
what extent the European spread data can be generated by a model of this type. The
discussion includes the e¤ects of policy interventions that resemble the OMT program
announced by the ECB in 2012.
Parameter values As discussed earlier, the key parameters to generate multi-
plicity are the ones that govern the stochastic process for the endowment, which must
alternate from being relatively high to being relatively low. We interpret the low en-
dowment regime as the possibility of relatively long periods of stagnation, whereas
the high endowment regime is associated with periods of relatively high growth. Our
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interpretation is motivated by the ongoing debate regarding secular stagnation in Eu-
rope, which is consistent with the alternating regimes of growth rates documented by
Hamilton (1989) and with the evidence provided in Jones and Olken (2008).
We now turn to specics. We construct a bimodal distribution made out of two
normals. Every period, with probability , the endowment is drawn from N(1; );
whereas with probability 1  ; the endowment is drawn from N(2; ) with 1 < 2:
For simplicity, we assume both distributions have the same standard deviation. The
relatively large di¤erences between the means of the two distributions, required to
exhibit multiplicity, are interpreted as the e¤ect of di¤erent growth rates of output for
a prolonged period of time. A period in the model is several years, such as a decade.
This period is similar to the average maturity of debt for most of the European countries
under discussion, so it is consistent with a single period maturity in the model. To
calibrate the di¤erence between the means, we estimate a Markov-switching regime for
the growth rate of output for Portugal, Spain, and Italy, and as well as for Argentina
and the United States, using data from 1960 to 2014. The di¤erence in yearly growth
rates between the high and low regimes is 4:77% for Spain, 5:11% for Portugal, and
3:45% for Italy.20 Because of the high convergence of these three economies during
the 1960s, we also estimated the system starting in 1970. The di¤erence between the
means drops to 3:5% for Spain, 4:85% for Portugal, and 3:14% for Italy. A growth
rate di¤erential between the high growth regime and the low growth regime of between
3:5% and 5% delivers an income gap between 40% and 60% in 10 years. Thus, we
assume in our benchmark case that 2 = 1:51.
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Computing the unconditional probabilities, , from our estimates, one obtains a
value of 0:31 for Italy, 0:40 for Spain, and 0:53 for Portugal using the estimation
starting in 1970.22 We therefore set, for our numerical exercises, a value of  = 0:3,
consistent with the lowest value obtained. We will also report what spreads we obtain
if we choose  = 0:5, the highest value obtained.
Finally, note that we assumed the probability  to be independent of the state.
20The corresponding numbers for Argentina and the United States are 8:78% and 3:45%. The
probability of the low growth state in the United States is lower than for the other countries. The
results do not change if we use data starting in 1970 in either case. See Appendix 3.
21If we also allow for standard deviations that depend on the state, the results barely change for
Spain and Portugal. However, for Italy, the estimates in this case present no di¤erence in the means,
but the standard deviation in one of the states becomes very high.
22The probabilities of the bad state are higher between 45% and 65% if we estimate the model
using data starting in 1960.
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We do this because in spite of the clear evidence of persistency in our estimates using
a yearly date, is that we interpret the period as a decade, so an i:i:d: distribution
therefore appears more natural.
The model has a few additional parameters. The rst three are not controversial.
First, we set the international interest rate R = 1:20; roughly consistent with a 2%
yearly rate during a decade. We allow the discount factor in preferences for the borrower
to be higher, so  = 0:7; consistent with a yearly discount factor of 0:96. Preferences
exhibit a constant relative risk aversion with parameter  = 6; so as to have a relatively
strong preference for consumption smoothing.
There are two remaining parameters: the value for consumption following default
and the probability of the sunspot that coordinates on alternative schedules. Following
default, the borrower is cut o¤ from international credit markets. To the extent that
integration to world markets is associated with the possibility of rapid growth, it is
natural to think that default could substantially reduce the probability of drawing from
the high-endowment distribution. Following this notion, we set the value of endowment
following default to be equal to yd = 1 = 4.
Finally, we assume that the sunspot distribution is i.i.d. p (s0js) = p, and we set
the probability of the sunspot that coordinates on the high interest rate schedule to be
0:2. All the results we show are essentially the same if we set that probability to be
0:4.
Characterization of equilibria Figure 7 plots the schedule of yearly interest
rates as a function of the debt level. For debt levels between 1:8 and 2:2, there are two
possible interest rates. Note that when there is multiplicity, rates range from 1:8% per
year to 5:6%, so this example delivers a spread of about 3:8% a year, which is close
to the maximum value of Spanish and Italian spreads but much smaller than the ones
of Portugal, Ireland, or Greece. This depends on our choice of a key parameter: the
probability of entering a period of stagnation,  = 0:3: If we set  = 0:5; the model
generates a spread of 9:5%: This number is still lower than those spreads observed
for Portugal, Ireland, or Greece. One reason for the observed high spreads in those
countries could be a run-up to default which has already happened in Greece that
our long-run calibration cannot capture.
A particular feature of the increasing schedule is the apparently at sections.23
23The schedules are not exactly at.
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Figure 7: Interest rate schedule R(b0; s)
This is the result of having two normal distributions with relatively large di¤erences in
mean, and very small standard deviations. Note that the "good" distribution has most
of the mass between 5:8 and 6:2 so that if the threshold is below 5:8 but not too far
away, increases in the threshold have a negligible e¤ect on the probability of default,
so they barely a¤ect the interest rates.
Figure 8 plots the policy functions for the debt levels as a function of wealth for
di¤erent realizations of the sunspot. There are innite ways to construct pairs of
schedules; we just chose to focus on the ones that choose either always the low interest
rate or always the high interest rate. The dashed red (solid blue) line corresponds
to the case in which the sunspot selects, for each value of the debt, the high (low)
interest rate. The horizontal axis is the wealth at the beginning of the period, which
is equal to the realization of the endowment minus debt gross of interest payments.
For values of the wealth above 2:8, the two policy functions coincide. This corresponds
to choices of debt that are below the value beyond which there is multiplicity. Thus,
for this region, the realization of the sunspot is inessential, and as wealth goes down,
the amount borrowed goes up the standard consumption-smoothing result. However,
for values of wealth close to but lower than 2:8, the behavior critically depends on the
realization of the sunspot. If the sunspot selects the lower schedule, debt keeps on
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Figure 8: Debt policy function b0 (!; s)
increasing as wealth goes down. Instead, if the sunspot selects the high schedule, debt
is invariant with wealth. The reason is that borrowing is close to 1:8, a value such that
the interest rate schedule exhibits a discontinuous jump in the interest rate when the
sunspot turns out bad (see Figure 7). Faced with such a high e¤ect on the interest rate,
the borrower reduces consumption one to one with wealth. Eventually, however, when
wealth is su¢ ciently low and so is current consumption the borrower is willing to
pay the xed cost of the high interest rate on all the debt, at which point debt increases
discontinuously. From there on, increases in the debt have very marginal e¤ects on the
rate, so debt once again goes up, one to one with the reduction in wealth.
The behavior of the policy function when the sunspot pins down the low interest
rate schedule is similar, except that the e¤ects occur for lower values of wealth: the
policy function attens when wealth reaches around 2:2 and jumps up discontinuously
once wealth is around 1:9.
Figure 9 plots the equilibrium interest rates as a function of wealth for the two
di¤erent realizations of the sunspot. As before, the dashed red (solid blue) line is the
interest rate if the sunspot selects the high (low) interest rate schedule. It is interesting
to highlight how the borrowers choices are key to understanding equilibrium outcomes.
The region of multiplicity is roughly the one where wealth is between 1:3 and 2:8.
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Figure 9: Equilibrium interest rates R (b0 (!; s) ; y; s)
And notice that, contrary to what one could have expected, the equilibrium interest
rate when in the bad sunspot (high interest rate) is lower, even if by a very small
amount, than the interest rate in the good sunspot for values of wealth between 1:9
and 2:8, close to two-thirds of the multiplicity region (see Figure 9). The reason
is simple: it is precisely because the borrower faces the high interest rate schedule
that it is willing to adjust consumption and avoid those high interest rates a form
of endogenous austerity. This rationalizes the notion that the probability of a crisis
may have a disciplinary e¤ect. This e¤ect, however, is present only up to a point:
once wealth is below 1:9; the borrower, facing the high interest rate schedule, has such
a pressing motive to borrow that he is willing to borrow at very high rates. When
shocks bring the borrower to this region, debt levels and interest rates go up in the
data another feature of the data throughout the European sovereign debt crisis.
This endogeneity of debt implies that equilibrium interest rates are less revealing of
the existence of multiplicity than borrowing choices. In Figure 10, we plot the ratio of
optimal debt choices (left vertical axis) and the interest rate di¤erential (right vertical
axis) for the two values of the sunspot. We focus on the range of values of wealth for
which there is multiplicity, roughly between 1:4 and 2:8. Although debt choices are
very di¤erent for the whole range, the interest rate di¤erentials are barely di¤erent for
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Figure 10: Debt and interest rate comparison
a large fraction of the range.
Policy intervention and multiplicity We now use the solution of the model
to illustrate how a sovereign debt crisis can unfold, thereby shedding light on the role
of the sunspot realization and the role of policy. The rst step is to dene the policy
intervention. We assume there exists an institution with enough funds that can o¤er
by itself an amount larger than the value eB, in Figure 7. A policy consists of a pair
(B;R) such that the institution is willing to lend funds to the borrower at a rate R; up
to a maximum value of B: Let eP = ( eB + ; eR + ") for low enough values of ";  where eB; eR is depicted in Figure 7 and " > 0;  > 0.
Then, by the same logic as that explained in Section 2.2, policy eP eliminates the
high interest rate schedule. In addition, in equilibrium, the institution lends no funds.
Note the importance of the maximum level eB: if  is too large and " small enough, it
may be optimal to borrow from the institution amounts larger than eB: But at those
values, the institutions expected return is lower than R.
Policy eP , by removing the high equilibrium schedule, is equivalent to setting the
probability of the sunspot to zero. To put it di¤erently, assume that the institution
implements policy P  with probability  and implements no policy with probability
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Figure 11: Simulation
(1   ): This is equivalent to an economy without any policy intervention and the
probability of the bad sunspot being p(1 ): By reinterpreting the parameters above,
we can simulate a sovereign default crisis and the policy intervention: we let ep = 0:4
and  = 0:5; so ep(1  ) = p = 0:2:
In Figure 11, we plot the time series of interest rates and debt choices after a
sequence of shocks. We start the economy with wealth equal to 3:2; a value for which
there is no multiplicity, and assume that the endowment shock is equal to four every
periodthe mean of the bad distribution. We assume that the good sunspot realizes for
four periods, after which time the bad sunspot realizes every period. Nature chooses
that policy is only implemented at period t = 11 and remains in place thereafter. As
can be seen from Figure 11, spreads go up once the bad sunspot is realized and come
down once policy is implemented. Note also that debt goes up when the spreads go
up, and then it comes down when the spreads come down, induced by the policy. In
this way, austerity arises endogenously once the policy is implemented.24
24It is worth emphasizing that we chose to simulate the case in which the borrower moves rst and
faces a schedule in which the interest rate depends on current actions. Had we solved the case in
which the lenders move rst so that the borrower takes todays intrest rates as given, we conjecture
that this endogenous austerity would not be as strong.
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5 Concluding remarks
In models with sovereign debt, interest rates are high when default probabilities are
high. The object of this paper is to investigate conditions under which the reverse
is also true, that default probabilities are high because interest rates are high. This
means that there can be equilibrium outcomes in which interest rates are unnecessarily
high and in which policy arrangements can bring them down. This exploration is
motivated by the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe, but it is also motivated by a
literature that does not seem to be consensual in this respect. Indeed, although Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) claim that there is a single equilibrium, Calvo (1988), using a
similar structure, shows that there are both high and low interest rate equilibrium
schedules. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008), building on Eaton and
Gersovitz, modify an important assumption on the choice of debt by the large player
and nd a single equilibrium. We show that small changes in timing assumptions and
actions of agents can explain these conicting results. Part of the analysis is related
to Lorenzoni and Werning (2015).
Assumptions on whether the country chooses the debt net of interest payments or
gross of those payments, or whether the borrower moves rst or the creditors do, are
not assumptions that can be obtained directly from data. The actual institutional
details behind bond auctions do not provide direct evidence on those assumptions.
Bond auctions are for announced quantities of discount bonds, but those quantities
are many times revised. So it is not clear whether the choice at those auctions is
for current debt or debt at maturity. Even if quantities of discount bonds were not
revised, there are multiple auctions in a reference period, and how many auctions there
are is a choice variable. In some auctions, lenders place price-quantity schedules, but
those quantities are the intended purchases of the lender, not the aggregate quantities.
Instead schedules in the models in which the borrower moves rst have the interest
rate be a function of the aggregate quantity. Auction data could in principle be used
to build a downward sloping schedule in the aggregate quantities, and that data is
available at least for discriminatory price auctions.25 If o¤ers are to be ranked from
high to low price, with corresponding total quantities, the schedule will be downward
sloping. Can this schedule correspond to the equilibrium schedule in a model where the
borrower moves rst? The equilibrium data produced by the model does not show a
25We thank Mark Aguiar for raising some of these issues.
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schedule, just a point, since homogenous creditors o¤er the same price. Heterogeneous
beliefs due to noise could explain a downward sloping schedule, but that would be the
case independently of the timing assumed.
Even if there is no direct evidence on the modelling assumptions, there is ample
indirect evidence. The multiplicity of equilibria that arises under some of those as-
sumptions is consistent with the large and abrupt movements in interest rates that are
observed in sovereign debt crises, whereas the single equilibrium is not.
With our timing assumptions, there are both high and low interest rate equilibria.
However some of those high interest rate equilibria, e. g. the ones in Calvo (1988),
are fragile to simple renements. That is no longer the case if the stochastic process
for output is bimodal, meaning that with relatively high probability output can be
either very high or very low. The empirical content of this is in the observation of long
periods of growth followed by long stagnations that can be found in data for many
countries.26
We pursue this line in a quantitative exercise. We calibrate a bimodal distribu-
tion for the endowment process with periods of stagnation, by estimating a Markov-
switching regime for the growth rate of output for the countries exposed to the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis, as well as for Argentina and the United States. We simulate
the fully dynamic version of the model in which a sunspot variable can induce high
frequency movements in interest rate equilibria.
We believe this can be a reading of a sovereign debt crisis. If so, then policies of large
purchases of sovereign debt, at penalty rates, in the spirit of the ones announced by the
ECB back in 2012, can have the e¤ect that they seem to have had, of bringing down
sovereign debt spreads. According to this view, the ruling of the German constitutional
court in early 2014, which "found that the central bank had overstepped its mandate
and that OMT was a back door to monetary nancingof governments outlawed under
European treaties," is unfounded.27
26In the unraveling of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, for some of the countries particularly
exposed to it, such as Portugal or Italy, the hypothesis that future growth was drawn from a regime
switching model with high and low growth, with high persistence, seems plausible.
27"The German courts and the ECB: It isnt over," The Economist, February 15th, 2014.
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Appendix 1
In this appendix, we perturb the game described in Section 2 by introducing a sec-
ond stage at the end of the rst period that allows for partial renegotiation. We
then explore the robustness of the equilibria described in Section 2 to "very small"
perturbations, in a sense we make precise later on.
Specically, and given any outcome (b; R) in the rst stage of period 1, nature
allows the borrower, with probability  2 (0; 1); to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of
an alternative interest rate equal to R  to a coalition of a fraction  of lenders where
 > 0 is exogenously given.28 The coalition then chooses to accept the new rate or to
keep the one in the rst stage. Period 2 is the same as before: given the amount owed
by the borrower and the realization of the endowment shock, the borrower decides to
default or pay the debt in full. The payo¤ following default is as before.
We denote by  2 (0; 1) the measure of lenders that may be called into the coalition.
It is important to emphasize that in this second stage, it is the coalition rather than
each individual lender making decisions. Each agent in the coalition is treated equally.
It is this assumption that imposes an -limited degree of coordination. As  ! 0;
there is no degree of coordination, and as we will show, the renement requires  to
be strictly bounded above zero. The rst stage is exactly as before: all lenders the
 ones that can be called into the coalition and (1   ) who cannot then compete
among each other, so they all charge the same rate in the rst stage.29
Let this perturbed game be denoted by G(; ).30 We rst characterize equilibria
in the games G(; ): In the spirit of trembling-hand perfection, we explore, given ,
which of the equilibria described in Section 2 are the limit of the sequence of equilibria
of the games G(; ) when  ! 0;  ! 0.
28Considering only reductions in interest rates is without loss of generality. If the borrower had the
option of choosing higher interest rates, he would never do so.
29Note that the perturbation introduces ex ante heterogeneity. We will focus on the limiting cases
where  ! 0 and  ! 0; so the heterogeneity is vanishing in the limit.
30The original game is equivalent to G(; 0) or G(0; ).
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Denition 2 Given  2 (0; 1); an equilibrium (R; b) in the game G(0; 0) is robust to
an  degree of coordination if it is the limit of the sequence of equilibria in the games
G(; ) when  ! 0 and  ! 0:
We will show that the equilibria in the decreasing part of the zero-prot schedule
R  R(b) [1  F (1 + bR(b))] (11)
do not survive a renement based on this perturbation, whereas equilibria in the in-
creasing part do. Two assumptions are key to obtaining the results. First, the auction
in the rst stage must be anonymous (Lemma 1).31 Second, a strictly positive degree
of coordination of lenders is required (Result 2).
We prove the results in a series of steps. First, we show that, as long as the auction
in the rst stage is anonymous, there is no equilibrium in the perturbed game in which
the o¤er is accepted.
Lemma 1 For any equilibrium of the perturbed game in which nature allows the bor-
rower to make the o¤er R  , the o¤er is rejected by the coalition if the auction in the
rst stage of the game is anonymous.
Proof. Assume there is an equilibrium with  > 0 where the o¤er is accepted. The
 members of the coalition get an interest rate of Rc with probability  and an interest
rate of Rc    with probability (1   ); whereas the lenders that cannot be part of
the coalition get an interest rate of Rn: The expected return for lenders within the
coalition is
R = (1  )Rc[1  F (1 + b [Rc + (1  )Rn])] (12)
+(Rc   )[1  F (1 + b[Rc + (1  )Rn   ])];
whereas the condition for the (1   ) fraction of agents that do not get to be part of
the coalition is
R = (1  )Rn[1  F (1 + b [Rc + (1  )Rn])] (13)
+Rn[1  F (1 + b[Rc + (1  )Rn   ])]:
31Anonymity is irrelevant for the game in Section 2, where all agents are homogeneous. But the
perturbation introduces heterogeneity, so anonymity is important in the perturbed game.
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As  > 0; Rn < Rc: It is immediate that this cannot be an equilibrium in a single-price
auction, whereRn = Rc: Consider now a multi-price auction, where each lender receives
the interest rate o¤ered. Note that for the borrower, borrowing from each lender type
implies the same expected payment. However, the lenders not in the coalition imply
a payment with certainty, so the borrower will choose those lenders rst. Thus, a
fraction (1  ) receives an interest rate of Rn and the fraction  receives the interest
rate Rc > Rn: It immediately follows that in an anonymous auction, the noncoalition
lenders best interest is to o¤er their funds at the rate Rc; where prots are higher than
R:
If the auction is not anonymous, the borrower can fully discriminate in a multi-
price auction and conditions (12) and (13) fully characterize the equilibrium interest
rates. Once the borrower cannot discriminate the lenders type, the single-price auction
provides incentives for truthful revelation but implies a unique interest rate, which
breaks down the equilibrium. On the other hand, in a multi-price auction, agents
not in the coalition do not have incentives to reveal their type, which also breaks the
proposed equilibrium.
Note also that the perturbation we consider is a simple one in which agents know
ex ante if they belong in the potential coalition or not. A more general perturbation
would allow for each lender to have a probability (j) of belonging to the coalition, withR b
0
(j)dj = : The only case in which there can be an equilibrium with an anonymous
auction in which an o¤er is accepted is the knife-edge case in which (j) =  for all
j; so (13) is not an equilibrium condition anymore. In this case all agents are ex ante
identical and anonymity plays no role.
We now characterize the conditions under which an o¤er will be accepted by the
coalition for  small enough.
Let the outcome of the rst stage be a point in the schedule (R; b); dened by (11) :
Assume that nature allows the borrower to o¤er R    to the coalition: If it accepts
the new rate, their return will be given by
(R  ) [1  F (1 + (1  )bR + b (R  ))]  E():
The new rate reduces the payment in case of no default, but it reduces the probability of
default, so the net e¤ect depends on which e¤ect dominates. We now nd a condition
such that the second e¤ect dominates, so reductions in the interest rates (positive
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values for ) can increase the expected payment to the coalition for small enough
perturbations, so  is close to zero. For that, we derive the expression above E() with
respect to  and evaluate it at  = 0 to obtain
E 0( = 0) =   [1  F (1 + b)] +R[f (1 + bR)b]:
This expression is positive when
Rb
f (1 + bR)
[1  F (1 + b)]  H(R; b) >
1

;
in which case the coalition would accept the o¤er for  small enough.32 We now show
the results mentioned above.
Result 1: If the pair (R1; b1) is an equilibrium in the original game and is in the
increasing part of the schedule dened by (11) ; then it is robust to an  degree of
coordination for any .
Proof. Di¤erencing the identity (11) with respect to b; we obtain
R
0
(b) =
R2f(1 + bR)
[[1  F (1 + bR)] Rbf(1 + bR)] :
If (R1; b1) is in the increasing part of the schedule, R
0
(b1) > 0: Since the numerator is
positive, this implies that the denominator must be negative, which implies that
R1b1
f(1 + b1R1)
[1  F (1 + b1R1)]  H(R1; b1) < 1:
Thus, H(R1; b1) < 1 < 1 for any  2 (0; 1]; which means that the o¤er is not accepted
for any degree of coordination, for some 1 that is small enough. This means that the
equilibrium in the original game, (R1; b1); is also an equilibrium in the perturbed game,
G(; ), for any  > 0; any , and any  < 1: It therefore follows that (R1; b1) is the
limit of this sequence of games when  ! 0;  ! 0:
Result 2: If the pair (R2; b2) is an equilibrium in the original game and is in the
decreasing part of the schedule dened by (11) ; then it is not robust to an  degree
32Note that the smaller the coalition, the strongest is this condition. This is why the coalition is
important.
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of coordination for any  > min; where min < 1 is the minimal required degree of
coordination.
Proof. If (R2; b2) is in the decreasing part of the schedule, R0(b2) < 0: Since the
numerator is positive,
R2b2
f(1 + b2R2)
[1  F (1 + b2R2)]  H(R2; b2) > 1:
Let
min =
1
H(R2; b2)
< 1:
Assume that (R2; b2) is robust to a min  degree of coordination. This means that
there is an equilibrium arbitrarily close to (R2; b2) in the game G(; ) for  > min
and small enough values for  and : By continuity of the function H(R; b); it follows
that if nature lets the borrower make an o¤er R2  ; it will be accepted by a coalition
larger than min; which contradicts Lemma 1.
Note that the value of min is related to the value of H(R2; b2) relative to 1: When
the slope of the schedule dened by (11) becomes very close to  1; which happens
when the equilibria in the decreasing schedule get arbitrarily close to the equilibria in
the increasing schedule, H(R2; b2) ! 1 and min ! 1; requiring an arbitrarily large
degree of coordination.
Appendix 2
In this appendix, we show how small perturbations to the uniform distribution can
give rise to multiple equilibria of the type obtained with the bimodal distribution.33
In the case of the uniform distribution, it is straightforward to obtain the solutions
of R = h (R; b), so that the supply curve can be described analytically. Let the
distribution of the endowment process be the uniform, f (y) = 1
Y 1 ; so that F (y) =
33The uniform distribution is used only as an example.
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y 1
Y 1 . Then, from (1), the equilibrium interest rates must satisfy
R =
1  1  4 Rb
Y 1
 1
2
2 b
Y 1
;
provided 1   4 Rb
Y 1  0. The maximum level of debt consistent with an equilibrium
with borrowing is given by bmax = Y 1
4R . Below this value of debt, for each b, there are
two possible levels of the interest rate.
Consider a perturbation g(y) of the uniform distribution, so that the density would
be f(y) = 1
Y 1 + g(y), with
R Y
1
g(y)dy = 0. In particular, the function g can be
g(y) = sin ky, with k = 2
Y 1N , where N is a natural number. If N = 0; the distribution
is uniform, so there is a single increasing schedule. If N = 1; there is a single full cycle
added to the uniform distribution. The amplitude of the cycle (relative to the uniform
distribution) is controlled by the parameter : The number of full cycles of the sin ky
function added to the uniform is given by N . As  ! 0, so does the perturbation:
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Figure 12: Perturbing the uniform distribution
Given a value for , the closer the debt to its maximum value, the larger the degree
of multiplicity. The equation
1
R
  1
R

1  1 + bR
Y   1    sin kbR

= 0
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has more than two solutions for R, for  that can be made arbitrarily small, as long as
b is close enough to bmax. On the other hand, if b is lower than bmax, there is always a
 > 0 but small enough such that there are only two zeros to the function above.
An illustration is presented in Figure 12 for two levels of the debt and for two
values of . As can be seen, when the debt is low, a positive value of  is not enough
to generate multiplicity, but multiplicity arises as the level of the debt goes up. Note
that if  is small, it may take a very long series to identify it in the data. Thus, it
is hard to rule out this multiplicity based on calibrated versions of the distribution of
output if the debt is close enough to its maximum.34
34This resembles the result in Cole and Kehoe (2000), where the fraction of short-term debt a¤ects
the chances of multiplicity.
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